

most of your time?

Helms: I did my ambassadorial chores in terms of representing the country at various governmental functions and national functions. I was the one who talked to the Shah, which I did with regularity. I was the one who talked to the Minister of Court, Alam, which I did with regularity. I was the one who talked to the Prime Minister and usually to other ministers, if that was necessary. I did some traveling in the country. I was obviously not in day-to-day charge of the workings of the embassy since I left that to the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission), which is the proper way to handle these matters in modern day embassies. But I did stay in touch and talked with most of the counselors. I had daily staff meetings in which I guided the work of the embassy. I briefed Codels, in other words Congressional delegations, when they came to Iran. In short, I think I did what ambassadors normally would do.

I was a bit handicapped by the fact that I was constantly being called back to Washington, first for the Watergate hearings and then later for hearings in connection with the investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1975. But despite sixteen round trips between Washington and Tehran or the United States and Iran in my term of office, which lasted for three and three quarter years, I still was able to stay on top of the job all right, at least as I saw it.

Q: Who were your key advisors at the embassy? Who did you rely most upon for say advice about political or economic matters that came up?

Helms: I had good DCMs. The first one was Douglas Heck. The second one was Jack Miklos. Both of those were thoroughly experienced foreign service officers. They had either worked on Iran or had been in Iran for some time. They were quite competent to advise with me. I had a good economic counselor in William Lehfeldt. I had two or three political counselors. But I was inclined to be my own political counselor. I had competent stations chiefs. So I had a good staff at the embassy. I was well treated in terms of the personnel assigned to Tehran by the Department of State and other governmental entities.

Q: Was there anybody that was particularly influential in your thinking about Iran, any one person that had some particular influence on your thinking about the country in the situation there?

Helms: I don't think there was any particular person. I got to know Iranians and began to talk to them and began to learn from them. I obviously learned from officers in the embassy. This was throughout a learning process, no doubt about it. But I can't point to any single individual that had more influence than another.

Q: Was there much supervision from Washington? Did you work under any particular constraints as Ambassador or did you have a fairly free hand in what you did and said?

Helms: Yes, I did. When I accepted the appointment to Iran it was

actually offered to me by the President himself, which is not usual. And I knew the President from my service as Director of Central Intelligence. I knew the Secretary of State because I'd known him when he was Attorney General and I'd know him around Washington in between. I knew the National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, who later became Secretary of State. And I had worked with him a great deal during the Nixon period. So I knew all of the key players. And I did not feel under any particular constraints.

As a matter of fact, when I went out to Tehran I was told orally by President Nixon that he wanted me also to keep an eye on the whole Persian Gulf area. At that time there was only one ambassador accredited to Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman. He resided in Kuwait with consuls posted to the other countries as residents. This ambassador would travel from Kuwait through the area. The President wanted regular reports about what I thought about the political and military situation throughout the Gulf. I subsequently recommended to him that he send ambassadors to each of those countries, because I thought this desirable in terms of the rise in the oil prices, the growing influence of that part of the world, the pride and dignity of these individual countries and their leaders. I thought that it would make our relations with these countries more effective and also more friendly. This recommendation was adopted.

Q: Okay. Did you have any important disagreements with Washington over any policy matters? Was it pretty much a consensus of policy throughout the years?

Helms: I think there may have been one or two occasions on which I may have disagreed with an instruction I was given, in which event I simply replied by telling them the reasons for disagreeing. But the policy of the United States toward Iran, I was in sympathy with. I didn't have any difficulty carrying it out.

Q: In terms of Washington, the officials who were concerned with Iran, was there any key official in the State Department or elsewhere who had a major hand in working out policy towards Iran? People like Sisco (Joseph), was he very important or of any particular importance? Or who were the key players?

Helms: I think that Henry Kissinger knew what the policy of the United States towards Iran was from his time with President Nixon in 1972. And he had been obviously working on Iran as he had on other parts of the world. The State Department obviously had its own ideas and gave me guidance. The country director for most of the time that I was in Iran was Charles Naas, who had served in Kabul and who had been working away for some time on Iranian affairs. He was highly competent and very helpful, a good back stopper. Before him, it had been Miklos, who later came to replace Heck, as I told you earlier. Miklos was also thoroughly conversant with policy on Iran and what had happened there over the years.

Q: Okay. I want to ask you some questions about the arms sales issues when you were Ambassador. When you were Ambassador, how heavy

was your involvement in arms sales issues? Was it something that took a lot of time over the years?

Helms: It was a question that was invariably on my desk, because as a result of the suggestion of President Nixon that the Shah buy military equipment from the United States and then the subsequent rise in oil prices in 1973 giving the Shah the money to buy the equipment he wanted, this obviously became big business. And every almost arms manufacturer in the United States came to Tehran.

[telephone interruption]

Q: You were talking about visits by arms salesmen to Iran.

Helms: Yes. So obviously I was involved in this. When Secretary James Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, sent over Richard Halleck and later Eric von Marbod, I dealt with these men regularly. I also dealt with Schlesinger. We were all doing our best to make sense out of this arms sales business, trying to see to it that the Shah was well served in the advice he was given about what the United States had, what this equipment would do for him, what he should purchase and so forth.

I realize that the belief exists that the Shah sort of had an open-ended arrangement with the United States on these arms sales. This was never the case as nearly as I could determine. Each purchase was discussed at great length with him. And the issue of whether he needed as much as he thought he did is a question that may never be resolved, except in the fashion that I mentioned earlier in

this interview, and that is: when the Iraqis attacked five years ago, Iran was unable to defend itself very well and the Iraqis took over Khorramshahr and half of Abadan. Finally they were stopped by the Iranians and then over a time were pushed out of Iran by the Iranian Army. Now without those arms, the Iranians wouldn't have been able to do this. It could of course be said about the Khomeini government in Iran that it's too bad that they had arms at all. But I don't take that position. I don't like the Khomeini government. But I'm not about to say that the Iranians need to give up ground to the Iraqis or vice versa in the context of Middle Eastern geopolitics.

In any event, all those people who were so wise that they knew exactly what the Shah needed, all those people in the United States government who were so wise that they knew exactly what the Shah needed, I'm not sure that in the end they were right at all. In any event, a major effort was made to police these arms sales, to handle them with some good sense, at times to put the brakes on. In other words, we tried to do the best we could.

Q: How would you characterize the decision-making process in the executive branch and maybe the embassy when it came to making decisions on particular weapons systems? What kind of a review process was involved?

Helms: There was an entire U.S. military mission in Iran called ARMISH/MAAG headed by a major general. There were two or three generals during my time.

Q: Yes, yes.

Helms: It was a major American advisory mission there to deal with arms sales and the training of Iranian military forces in their use.

Q: Say, in terms of the executive branch back in Washington, it's been charged, I guess in the Senate Committee report of 1976, the report the whole committee put out, they suggested that the arms sales decisions were exempted from the ordinary review channels in the Defense Department and State Department, that the military arms sales bureaucracies in the--

Helms: Was this the Inspector General's report of the State Department?

Q: The staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made a report in 1976 on arms sales to Iran. They essentially said that the State Department's and the Defense Department's review channels for arms sales decisions had been more or less taken out of the process or something?

Helms: I don't remember the details of that anymore. There are other documents on this subject and other individuals who know a lot more about this than I do. I wouldn't want to debate that with you, because I don't know what the regular review channels were at that time.

Q: Yes. Well, it was mostly the mission of the embassy staff to look at these decisions and not so much the people in Washington?

Helms: Well, I think people in Washington looked at them, too.

Q: Yes, yes.

Helms: And certainly this ARMISH/MAAG group looked at them. I mean the ARMISH/MAAG had many more people than the Embassy. It was a big outfit.

Q: Okay. Now after late 1973, when the oil prices went up to great levels, and there was a great increase in Iran's national income as a result of the OPEC price increases, was there any effort to review or reconsider arms sales policy as their purchasing power went up or was this policy more or less continued?

Helms: The policy was continued pretty well throughout. I won't say that it wasn't reviewed from time to time, because it was, but one had a situation here in which it seemed desirable from a policy standpoint to have an Iran that was strong militarily. The Shah was able to purchase the weapons. The purchase of the weapons was useful to the United States government because it made money. This was one way of recycling the so-called petrol dollars that were being dispensed in order to buy oil. So it was regarded as a reasonably satisfactory economic arrangement for the United States.

Q: So it was sort of a strategic aspect in terms of the Shah's role in the area, plus there were commercial considerations reinforcing those?

Helms: That's right. Exactly.

Q: Okay. Was there any concern about the impact that massive weapons purchases had on the Iranian military infrastructure and economic infrastructure? That they might overload that?

Helms: There was always this question, because it was quite clear to the embassy, it was clear to ARMISH/MAAG, that the great shortage that Iran was going to have was men who were trained to handle sophisticated weapons: sophisticated aircraft, ships, tanks and so forth. So there was a vast training program going on not only to train enlisted men to do ordinary military duties but also to train officers to handle sophisticated equipment. This was where obviously there was a crunch, because, at the rate the Shah was buying the equipment, there was a question of whether the manpower could be supplied to man the equipment in adequate numbers.

Q: I've read in the mid-1970s you were quoted as saying that the problems that this was causing were so difficult to manage that you sort of washed your hands of certain phases of this question. This is a quote I read in a secondary work.

Helms: In the what?

Q: --saying that you had almost washed your hands of the whole business of arms sales because it was so difficult to manage, the oversight was so difficult.

Helms: I don't understand. Where was I alleged to have said this?

Q: This was in a secondary work on Iran. It was quoted from something like the Manchester Guardian, I think? Someone quoted you to that effect.

Helms: I don't recall ever having made a comment like that. I didn't have any sensation that I washed my hands of arms sales. I obviously was not in a position to make a judgment about every single purchase, but I did have the feeling there was an organization in being and in position to do this job adequately. I don't recall ever having made that statement.

Q: Okay, okay. I guess one implication of the expansion of the Iranian military system was a growing presence of U.S. nationals in Iran, technicians, experts, military contract people and so forth. Was there any concern that this presence might cause problems in terms of like a nationalist reaction in Iran?

Helms: Certainly there was concern. There was concern on my part. I felt that the American presence was getting too large. It was

around 10,000 when I arrived. I think at one time it got as high as 40,000 or more all through Iran. I felt this was wrong and unnecessary. I attempted to take actions to alleviate it. I did away with the mission to the Gendarmarie which has been in existence for some years. I did away with the Peace Corps. I attempted to head off desires on the part of various parts of our military establishment to set up more bases and more units in Iran. As things were closed down in Turkey, there was great pressure to use Iran as a physical location for various kinds of equipment. And particularly during the latter two years I was there, I tried to fight these off. I thought it was a great mistake to put any more assets, military or otherwise, into that country. There was too much there already in my opinion.

Q: Apparently, there were very high pressure tactics used by arms salesmen of the U.S. and so forth and they've been charged with bribery of the Iranian officials and so forth during this period. Did these cause diplomatic problems for you?

Helms: One never likes those incidents because they do cause difficulties and diplomatic problems. Fortunately none of them turned out to be insoluble. None of them worked in such a way that we couldn't continue to do business with the Iranians on a daily basis.

Q: Did the embassy try to play a role in trying to clean up these things. Were there efforts made or actions taken by the embassy staff to supervise these things?

Helms: I don't think the embassy knew much about these alleged bribery efforts. There was one episode that became quite notorious involving some brothers called Lavi. This had to do with the sale of the Grumman F-14 aircraft. That's one I remember. If there were others, they don't leap to mind. But the Iranians were trying to deal with this. The Americans were trying to deal with it. It is not an easy subject to control because it obviously is done surreptitiously. It's done clandestinely. And unless somebody blows the whistle, it seldome comes to light.

Q: I read that Secretary Schlesinger briefed the Shah at one point or the other on the implications of buying sophisticated military hardware. Do you recall any kind of briefings of that sort?

Helms: If he briefed the Shah, I doubt it was in the terms that you describe. I know he certainly had discussions with the Shah. And I have no doubt that he pointed out some of the problems inherent in buying certain types of equipment, military supplies, from the United States. But when you put it in a phrase, the way you phrased it there, I doubt very much if he would have looked the Shah in the eye and said anything like that to him.

Q: Oh, of course, yes. But what was his purpose? Do you think it was something of a purpose in trying to get them to rationalize their purchases in some way?

Helms: I think he was trying to slow down the orders that the Shah was making. He was trying to make this into an orderly procedure. I think he saw that if we weren't careful, we'd be sending equipment over there that couldn't be used, couldn't be taken from the docks, couldn't be absorbed, and he was anxious to handle this whole procedure in an orderly fashion. I think that's the best term.

Q: Let me turn this over.

[end of side one, tape two; beginning of side two, tape two]

You mentioned earlier that Schlesinger sent over Richard Halleck to sort of work with the Iranians in the embassy on arms sales issues?

Helms: Halleck used to work with the Iranians to give them professional advice about the U.S. weapons systems and what they could be used for and how they were designed and developed. In other words, he was put in as a sophisticated advisor to the Iranians who were involved in purchasing weapons from the United States.

Q: Now it's been charged that he ended up promoting some of the activities of his own consulting firm?

Helms: For that you'll have to ask Secretary Schlesinger. I've heard those allegations. There were in newspaper articles about them. It was charged in the Inspector General's report from the State Department, as I recall it. But the merits of the case you'll have to get from somebody else.

Q: Okay. The other, of course, you said was Eric von Marbod, who was sent over also.

Helms: He went over, yes.

Q: Did you meet with him and discuss these matters with him?

Helms: Regularly with both Halleck and him.

Q: What was the net effect of these efforts? Did they have any actual effect on their purchasing system?

Helms: Yes. I think both men were persuasive. I think they both had good relationships at the time they were there with General Toufanian. He was the key military figure in all arms purchases. And I think that they made a significant contribution to the orderly process of arms sales to Iran. I found them both able men.

Q: Okay. I've read that there was a plan to build a naval and submarine base with nuclear submarines at Chah Bahar?

Helms: Chah Bahar was the right place. What they were going to build in Chah Bahar, or at one time started to build, but I don't think they got very far with it, was a naval base. But the idea that it was a naval base designed for nuclear submarines I think was taking it a lot farther than the Shah had in mind, certainly.

Because Chah Bahar is pretty much the end of the world. And the building of a base there was going to be an absolutely major undertaking. I know about this base and I used to talk with the Shah about it. What it was designed to do was to be a major naval base in that part of the world for all kinds of vessels.

Q: Did any of the people in the U.S. Navy have any ideas about a large role in terms of nuclear subs?

Helms: I don't know where this idea came from. Do you know where you picked it up?

Q: I read this in Robert Graham's book Illusion of Power. He mentions it in passing.

Helms: Who is Robert Graham?

Q: He was correspondent for the Financial Times of London, I think, in Iran in the seventies. He wrote a book called the Illusion of Power. I think he mentions that in passing.

Helms: There's been a lot of controversy about that Chah Bahar base only in the sense that the Shah had the impression that the United States Navy wanted him to build the base and other people said the United States Navy never indicated any such thing to the Shah, that this was his own idea. The merits of the case I cannot decide for you. All I know was that the Shah intended to build a naval base

there. Chah Bahar translates into English as "Four Springs." The one thing the Iranians had built there was an air base. They had put in an air field, but it wasn't occupied at the time that I was in Iran and I don't know whether it ever has been.

Q: Were you involved in any of the discussions of the IBEX project?

Helms: Yes, I knew about the IBEX project.

Q: I guess, it was part of the monitoring process of Soviet missile tests?

Helms: IBEX was a large project which had generally to do with an air defense system. I think it's probably classified to this day. I don't know whether you can get anybody to talk to you about IBEX or not. Ask Secretary Schlesinger about it. If you can't get him, maybe you can find one of the Agency station chiefs who knew about it. IBEX was being run by the Agency, I believe.

Q: I've read there was controversy over it, whether it should go through or not?

Helms: I don't think there was controversy about whether it should go through. Any controversy there was had to do with design, with how it should be put together, because it was a very complicated involving different kinds of equipment, different companies and contractors.

Q: Was the project abandoned when you were there or was it after you had left?

Helms: It must have been after I left.

Q: Okay. Now in the summer of 1976, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff issued a report that was very critical of U.S. arms sales policy in Iran. It was put together by the staff of the committee. Do you recall any particular response to this report from the Shah or American officials? Was there much concern about its political impact?

Helms: I was there in 1976, but I have to be frank enough to say I don't remember the report.

Q: Well, apparently it said things like the arms sales process is out of control.

Helms: The Foreign Relations Committee was never very much in favor of this. The Committee was in the hands of liberal Senators that weren't in favor of these things anyway. I don't recall that a great deal of attention was paid to the report.

Q: Let's stop this for a second.

[tape interruption]

Okay. One thing the report said apparently--I've read through

it--it charged that Nixon and the Ford Administrations had lost control of the arms sales process and the situation because of a desire to avoid the short term political problems that would be caused by refusal to sell weapon systems to the Shah. Is there anything to that?

Helms: I don't know what they mean. In charges about things being out of control and not properly supervised, those are all subjective judgments and they're probably made by a staff that was unsympathetic to the whole idea of selling arms to Iran. There is an element in this country that doesn't believe in arms sales. They believe that it causes trouble and doesn't help the United States, etcetera, etcetera. They're entitled to their opinion, but they aren't necessarily very practical people either.

Q: Now some members of Congress, like Lee Hamilton, suggested in 1976 that U.S. policy in Iran was a high risk venture. Did Congressional critics visit Iran very often? Were there visits by people who were critical of policy that came to talk with you?

Helms: Yes, Senators and Congressmen came in significant numbers to Iran. Codels were showing up frequently. They were well informed on what was going on in Iran.

~~Q: Well, how did you respond to critics? Did you have to deal with them when they came to Iran?~~

Helms: Oh, we had arguments and debates about various elements, but it depended on who the critic was as to what he was criticizing. There was a lot of criticism of human rights in Iran and whether the Shah was torturing people and whether SAVAK was bringing people to trial properly. There were many arguments of this kind, and some of them had validity. It can be said, I think in fairness, that Senators and Congressmen tend to be meddlesome in foreign affairs. Nothing is going to stop that. I suppose that as long as we have our present form of government, it will continue. But I have not felt that, by and large, it was the most constructive approach to our relations in the world and to our various policies.

The Constitution gives foreign policy to the President of the United States. The extent to which the Congress meddles in that, you know, varies from decade to decade and from administration to administration and from period to period. But the merits of that meddlesomeness, I think, are sometimes highly debatable.

Q: Now I've got a question on arms sales policy. Did the Nixon or Ford Administration see growing Iranian dependence on U.S. weapons systems as a way to sort of influence the course of the Shah's military and foreign policy, as a way to sort of constrain the Shah?

Helms: If they did, it didn't work, because the Shah in those days was not about to be browbeaten by any other country. He now had money. He now had arms. He had standing in the world. And he was not to be told by foreigners how to run his business.

Q: Do you think some people could actually see arms sales as a way to exert U.S.--?

Helms: I know people are always seeing things in certain lights because they believe that the Shah was doing the wrong thing, therefore we should have developed levers to make him do the right thing. But it would have been the right thing only in their concept, not necessarily the right thing.

This is true of foreign policy throughout. There is always someone or some group or some entity in this country who feels very strongly that the United States should intrude in the affairs of other countries and tell their people how to run the country properly. My feeling is that a little of that goes a long way. We should concentrate our attention on running the U.S.A. properly, which I doubt that we do.

Q: Besides arms sales, another issue that concerned them, the Congress and the public in the U.S., were human rights issues which you mentioned briefly a minute ago. Now before criticisms of the Shah's policy became widespread in 1975, I think, had the embassy or the Department taken any special interest in human rights issues in Iran?

Helms: U.S. policy has always had a civil rights cast to it. Any time there was an opportunity to influence the Shah or any of his ministers about civilized behavior or human rights violations, the opportunity was taken. But this was not a subject that one could

talk about every day of every week and still have any listenership. It's fine to say, "Send the Ambassador in to see the Shah and tell him we won't stand for this any more." I think that is a silly way to do business because most leaders react to that by saying, "Who says this? And precisely what are you going to do about it?" And last but not least, "What business is it of yours?" Therefore, this civil rights business is a very difficult thing to deal with. And I know that people like Patricia Darian, who was the Civil Rights Assistant Secretary in the Carter Administration, prides herself on what she is able to achieve under this rubric. But I have yet to see very much evidence of it. It's mostly in the eye of the beholder. We think right now that we're going to change the policies of the government of South Africa. We see this on the streets every day and in the newspaper every day. Now let's see how it works out in the end.

Q: But domestic political interest in the United States about human rights in Iran, was this pressure translated into any kind of policy approaches to the Shah? Was this pressure a concern in the State Department or the embassy?

Helms: There was concern about the reports that one heard and this used to be taken up from time to time. I had some discussions myself with various Iranian officials about how they were handling some of these matters. But whether I was told the truth in the reply to the questions I put to them, whether they did anything about what I asked them to do, there was no way to follow up.

Q: Did you bring things up to the Shah as well or was this something you didn't discuss?

Helms: I discussed various unpleasant things with the Shah from time to time, corruption and human rights and so forth. But one can only take those matters up to a certain point. After that, you wear out your welcome.

Q: What was the Shah's usual response when you brought it up?

Helms: On the question of human rights, the Shah held the conviction that he was running his country and that if there was any rough stuff it was necessary--and that was the end of that. I'd like to say this: standards in the Middle East and in the Orient are different from what they are in the United States. If one really looked carefully at every single country out in that part of the world, as to how they handle these civil rights, I think one would find problems and difficulties in every single one of them, according to American standards. Then we turn around and we say: well, we've such a good society ourselves. All you have to do is read what goes on in our prisons and slums in the United States and you wonder if our society is all as great as we make it out to be.

Q: Now some critics, as well as a former Agency employee, have stated that the CIA had helped provide SAVAK with instructions of torture and so forth?

Helms: That's a lie. That's an absolute lie.

Q: When did you resign from your ambassadorship? Did you want to say something?

Helms: No, no, I was just going to add that the Agency never gave lessons in torture to anybody. That was not on, simply not on, ever.

Q: Okay. When did you resign from your ambassadorship? When was your final month? What period did you leave?

Helms: I resigned. I sent in my letter of resignation in August or September--I can't remember anymore--of 1976. I waited and waited and waited for it to be announced and finally it was announced on Election Day night in 1976. In other words, it was on the evening news at the end of Election Day. We actually departed two or three days after Christmas in 1976. We flew through Switzerland and then on to Morocco. We spent New Years in Morocco.

Q: Are there any particular reasons you resigned that you want to discuss or just--?

Helms: No, I can simply put in for the record that I resigned when I did because I did not want my resignation to be interpreted as being in any way influenced by the outcome of the Presidential election. I wanted to leave the government. I thought it was time for me to

retire from the government. I'd been in it for thirty odd years. And I wanted to leave with a feeling that I, to the end, did not have partisan feelings about who was elected President. So I timed my resignation long enough before the election that this interpretation could not be placed on it.

Q: When you left the country, what was your reading of the situation in Iran, the political and economic situation?

Helms: The economic situation had not been good in the preceding months. Things had slackened off. There was no doubt about that. But I did not have any sense that the Shah was going to fall or that there was any real instability in the country. All those indications that seemed to develop in a way that one could feel, see, and identify, came later.

Q: In retrospect--

Helms: You see, between the time I left and the time of those first riots in January of 1978, a whole year went by, a whole twelve months. So I don't think that it's particularly surprising that at the time I left, no one was predicting the Shah's demise.

Q: Now besides the things you've mentioned already, like the alleged deal about the CIA's not spying on the Shah in exchange for monitoring facilities for Soviet missile tests--that's one story you had said was not true. Were there any other decisions or events that

you think have been incorrectly reported at that time or later on?

Helms: Oh, there are all kinds of things that have been incorrectly reported.

Q: Are there any that you want to mention?

Helms: I don't think I could bring any to mind just that quickly. If you find at some time that there is a particular item which needs clarifying, you can always get back to me.

Q: Okay, in retrospect what is your assessment of the Nixon, Kissinger, Ford policy in Iran? What do you think its major strengths were, maybe major weaknesses that you want to talk about?

Helms: Oh, I'd rather not try to make an assessment of that. It doesn't do any good. They were doing the best they could. What they were doing seemed sensible and rational at the time, particularly in terms of the world as they saw it then: the balance of forces, the disposition of American power, the necessity to retrench, all of these things. The fact that eventually the Shah was swept away and to power came this clerical government, even those who disliked the Shah most and were anxious to get rid of him didn't realize what they were going to get. So nobody comes out in this situation with any prescience, with any accurate predictions of the future. Nobody has ever come up and said that they knew it was going to turn out this way. Those scholars like James Bill, Marvin Zonis and the rest of

them, who really followed Iran closely, they thought the Shah might go sometime, but they thought a group was going to come in like the National Front, or something of that kind, to run the country and everything was going to be fine. They totally missed or miscalculated the strength of the religious forces.

Q: After you left the ambassadorship, you went into business with Iranian issues, or didn't you concern yourself with Iran?

Helms: I set up this company, the Safeer Company, with an Iranian partner, who was a businessman. But when the Shah fell, that was all over. Since then, I have run this company by myself. I haven't had any identification with things Iranian at all here lately.

Q: Only through 1979?

Helms: Yes.

Q: Between the revolution or before, did the Carter people ask you for any advice or did you play any role?

Helms: No. I didn't play any role. I was not asked for advice by President Carter or his Administration. On one occasion I was approached, that was in, I think, the last days of 1978, when the hostage crisis was still hot and still going on. I was asked one day to come over to the White House and talk to David Aaron and Gary Sick about what might be done in Iran. By that time, there was very

little I could suggest that could be done, but I did go and talk to them. That's the only time I was consulted.

Q: Okay. No further questions. Thank you very much for the interview.

Helms: Not at all.

[end of interview]

HELMS, RICHARD

Name	Page
Aaron, David,	86
Akins, James E.,	39
Al-Bakr, General Hasan,	17
Alam, Amir Asadollah,	22-23,56-57,61
Algiers Agreement of 1975,	18,34,44-48
All Fall Down,	51
Amini, `Ali,	9
Amuzegar, Jamshid,	21,29,36
An Ambassador's Wife in Iran,	19
Ansari, Hushang,	21,29
ARMISH/MAAG,	15,66-69
Bakhtiyar, Shapur,	31
Barzani, Molla Mostafa,	48
Bazargan, Mehdi,	31
Bhutto, Zolfaqar-`Ali,	42
Bill, James,	31,85-86
Boumedienne, Houari,	45
Boyer Ahmadi Tribe,	24
Callahan, Arthur,	18
Carter, James E.,	86
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),	4-7,12,61,63,82,84
Darian, Patricia,	81
Eqbal, Manuchehr,	22-23,57
Events of 1953,	1-7
Evron, Eppi,	27
Feysal, King of Saudi Arabia,	36,44,54-55
Financial Times Newspaper,	75
Ford, Gerald R.,	78-79,85
Goiran, Roger,	3
Goodwin, Joseph,	3
Graham, Robert,	75
Grumman Corporation,	72
Halleck, Richard,	65,73-74
Hamilton, Lee,	78
Heck, Douglas,	62,64
Helms, Cynthia,	19
Helms, Pearsall,	1
Hoveyda, Amir `Abbas,	21
Illusion of Power,	75
Johnson, Lyndon B.,	9
Kennedy, John F.,	9
Khaled, King of Saudi Arabia,	44
Khal`atbari, `Abbas `Ali,	27
Khomeini, Ayatollah Seyyed Ruhollah,	33-34
Kissinger, Henry,	13-16,36,40-41,59-61, 63-64,85
Kosygin, Alexi,	43-44
Lehfeldt, William,	42,62
Lubrani, Uri,	26-28
Majidi, `Abdol-Majid,	22
Manchester Guardian Newspaper,	70
Miklos, Jack,	62,64
Mossadeq, Mohammad,	1-6,34

HELMS, RICHARD

Name	Page
Mossadeqi, Taqi,	22
Mostowfi, Baqer,	22
Naas, Charles,	26,64
National Front,	31
National Iranian Gas Company,	22
National Iranian Oil Comapany (NIOC),	22
National Iranian Petroleum Company,	22
Nationalization of Oil of 1950-51,	34
Nixon, Richard M.,	13-16,40,51-52,59-61, 63-65,78-79,85
OPEC,	34-39,54
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah,	1,4-61,65-87
Pahlavi, Queen Farah,	25
Parsons, Sir Anthony,	58
Peace Corps,	71
Qabus, Sultan of Oman,	52
Rastakhiz Party,	28-29
Revolution of 1978-79,	57-60,84
Rogers, William,	63
Roosevelt, Kermit,	2-3,6-7
Sadat, Anwar,	36-37
Saddam Hosein,	17,44-46
Sanjabi, Karim,	31
SAVAK,	6,32,33,56,57,79,82
Schlesinger, James,	65,72-73,76
Sick, Gary,	25,51,86
Simon, William,	39
Sinai Disengagement Treaty of 1975,	55
Sisco, Joseph,	64
Smith, Walter B.,	4
Stemple, John,	60
Stone, Howard,	3
Sullivan, William,	26
Tufaniyan, General Hasan,	22,48,74
Von Marbod, Eric,	65,74
White Revolution of 1963,	20
Wisner, Frank G.,	2
Zahedi, General Fazlollah,	4
Zonis, Marvin,	31,85-86



